Between Iran and the Gulf, Egypt walks a tightrope
2026-03-16 - 22:28
While most Arab states have been absorbing hundreds of Iranian drone and missile attacks or have become fronts by Iranian proxies, Egypt has remained outside the regional confrontation, two and a half weeks into the war. Not only has not a single projectile been launched toward Egyptian territory, even the Houthi rebels in Yemen have so far refrained from disrupting shipping in the Red Sea bound for the strategically vital Suez Canal. Egypt's government takes pride in this and attributes it to a combination of quiet diplomacy and significant military power. Even so, Cairo has been forced to respond to the attack on its allies in the Persian Gulf. These states form the backbone of Egypt's economy. The relationship is not limited to financial aid, loans and investments. Millions of Egyptian workers are employed in these countries and send foreign currency home to their families. If the Iranian launches and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz continue for an extended period, the Gulf states could suffer unprecedented economic damage that would directly affect Egypt's own economy. Egypt's economy is particularly vulnerable to crises. Even a minor economic shock could push masses into the streets. IDF strikes in Tehran. Photo: AFP "Cannot ignore it" Burak Çelik, a Turkish expert on Middle Eastern foreign relations, tells Israel Hayom that Egypt is pursuing an extremely cautious balancing strategy amid the war. "Cairo has no interest in being dragged directly into the confrontation, but it cannot ignore the strategic consequences of prolonged regional escalation," Çelik said. "From its perspective, the main concern is not Iran itself, but the potential instability in the region and the risk of additional economic pressure at home." "At the same time, Cairo seems to be quietly aligning with the broader Sunni Arab consensus that favors containing Iranian influence while maintaining diplomatic flexibility. It is trying to remain strategically relevant without becoming a frontline actor in the confrontation. Egypt's position appears less active and more like controlled strategic caution." Iranian attack in the United Arab Emirates. Photo: AFP Acting as mediator Egypt's answer has been to attempt to position itself as a mediator, similar to its role during the war in Gaza, perhaps in the hope that such conduct will remove it from Iran's list of targets. "The strategy of mediation has proven effective, and many countries in the region have learned from the Qatari experience that it pays to be a channel of communication, even with Islamist actors," explained Dr. Ariel Admoni of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. "In the context of the war with Iran, Egypt, like the rest of the Arab world, has noticed that Qatar has been attacked much less, and its civilian assets have been less of a target compared to the rest of the Gulf." Still, Admoni agreed that diplomacy has not truly protected the Gulf states. Qatar, Saudi Arabia and even the Sultanate of Oman were ultimately struck, though in far smaller numbers than the United Arab Emirates. According to him, "Saudi Arabia has also appeared in reports as having approved Trump's decision to strike. The reliability of the reports is less important than the fact that their very existence raises suspicion toward them in Tehran." "At the same time, Qatari spokesmen have emphasized that the Iranians did not give advance warning of their attack at the beginning of the war, suggesting that some form of communication between Doha and Tehran now exists regarding the strikes." Qatar's Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani against the backdrop of the capital, Doha | Photo: AFP Warming relations again Cairo's decision to emphasize the diplomatic channel has also created tensions with its allies. Egyptian sources have reported dissatisfaction in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates with Egypt's approach. According to those sources, such messages were conveyed to diplomatic officials in the Gulf, prompting Egypt to work to warm relations again. The tension stems not only from official statements but also from commentary in Egyptian media outlets, which in some cases portray the Iranian regime in a relatively positive light. These commentators are widely perceived as informally echoing the Egyptian government's position. For example, retired Egyptian general Wael Rabie wrote in the newspaper Sawt al-Umma that "Israel and the US gambled that assassinations of senior regime figures would stir the Iranian street and push it toward rebellion or revolution, but the exact opposite happened." "The developments showed that the state and society in Iran moved toward cohesion around the regime and strengthened internal solidarity rather than division," Rabie wrote. An Iranian flag stands near a collapsed building around Ferdowsi Square after an airstrike in central Tehran. Photo: EPA Cairo orchestrated by Tehran "Since the start of the war between the US and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, everything we read, watch or hear from the heart of Cairo appears to be orchestrated from Tehran," Egyptian commentator and writer Mohamed Saad Khiralla tells Israel Hayom. "Military experts, media figures, journalists, writers, representatives of unions and parties, and above all the religious institution Al-Azhar all seem to belong to killed supreme leader Ali Khamenei." He argued that the reason is simple: Iran is fighting Israel, which creates blind loyalty toward the clerical leadership in Tehran. As a result, leading writers and journalists in the Gulf states, who tend to echo the voices of their own rulers, have expressed disappointment with Egypt's stance. According to Khiralla, some have even said they would not "give a single dollar to Egypt," accusing it of living on loans and donations. Khiralla added that another factor behind the tension is Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi's repeated assurances that "Gulf security is part of Egypt's security," that "Gulf security is a red line," and that "the Egyptian army treats the Gulf as if it were part of Egypt itself." "But when the moment of truth arrived," he said, "it turned out that Egypt's army is closer to Iran's mullahs than to the Gulf states." The Egyptian expatriate in Europe even called on major powers to halt military aid to Egypt. "It would be absurd if the Iranian regime collapses while the dictatorship in Egypt survives," he said. Another factor behind Cairo's conduct appears to be concern within Egypt's leadership about the possible collapse of the Iranian regime. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the two countries have maintained deep rivalry despite occasional warming of relations. Nevertheless, Egypt appears to prefer the current balance of power. First, there is concern that various Shiite groups could act independently and destabilize the region. Second, Cairo has little desire to see Israel gain additional regional strength. Third, there is a deep fear that a new revolution in Iran could ignite a wave of protests that might threaten Egypt's own regime.